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Antitrust: What Counts as Consumer Welfare?
Herbert Hovenkamp*
Introduction
The antitrust laws speak in unmistakably economic terms about
the conduct they prohibit. The Sherman Act is directed toward
conduct that “restrains trade” or “monopolizes” markets.1 The Clayton
Act prohibits conduct whose effect may be substantially to “lessen
competition” or “tend to create a monopoly.”2 Even so, economic
effects can be measured in different ways. The dominant view of
antitrust law today is its rules should be based on a “consumer welfare”
principle. We assume that consumers are best off when prices are low.
Dissenters on the right would include seller profits in their conception
of consumer welfare. Those on the left would expand antitrust to
incorporate political goals, pursue large firm size or industrial
concentration for its own sake, or include effects such as wealth or
social inequality.
A statement released by the Biden-Sanders Unity Task Force
in July, 2020, speaks about the need for greater antitrust enforcement
in several areas.3 It expresses concern about health care mergers that
raise price, an acknowledged problem that clearly falls within the
consumer welfare principle.4
It does the same thing for

*

James G. Dinan University Professor, Univ. of Pennsylvania Carey Law
School and The Wharton School.
1
15 U.S.C. §1 (prohibiting contracts, combinations, or conspiracies in
restraint of trade); 15 U.S.C. §2 (prohibiting those who monopolize or
attempt to monopolize commerce).
2
All three substantive antitrust sections of the Clayton Act prohibit the
conduct they cover when it threatens to “substantially … lessen competition
or tend to create a monopoly.” See 15 U.S.C. §13 (price discrimination); 15
U.S.C. §14 (tying and exclusive dealing); 15 U.S.C. §18 (mergers).
3
Biden-Sanders Unity Task Force Recommendations (July 8, 2020),
available at https://joebiden.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/UNITYTASK-FORCE-RECOMMENDATIONS.pdf.
4
Id. at 33.
1
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anticompetitive outcomes in agricultural processing.5
More
problematically, it would “Charge antitrust regulators with
systematically incorporating broader criteria into their analytical
considerations, including in particular the impact of corporate
consolidation on the labor market, underserved communities, and
racial equity.”6 It also speaks of reversing the impact of Trumpadministration mergers “to repair the damage done to working people
and to reverse the impact on racial inequity.”7
The temptation to use antitrust to achieve broader goals is
understandable. The broad and brief language of the antitrust laws
incorporate an elastic mandate and is directed at the courts. They can
become a vehicle for achieving goals through the judicial system that
are more difficult to achieve legislatively. By contrast, the consumer
welfare principle is a way of limiting the scope of antitrust to a set of
economic goals with consumers identified as the principal
beneficiaries.
Most descriptions of the consumer welfare principle refer to
prices: the goal of the antitrust laws should be to combat monopolistic
prices. Articulating the goal in this way raises conceptual problems
when we think about suppliers. For example, the antitrust concern
with labor is with wage suppression, which means that wages are
anticompetitively low.
This can collide with a common
misperception, which is that low wages invariably produce low
consumer prices.
One thing that buyers and sellers have in common, however, is
that both are injured by anticompetitive output reductions. Price and
output move in opposite directions. While monopoly involves prices
that are too high and monopsony (monopoly buying) involves prices
that are too low, both require lower output. As a result, when consumer

5

Id. at 52, 68.
Id. at 67.
7
Id. at 74.
6
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welfare is articulated in terms of output rather than price, it protects
both buyers and sellers, including sellers of their labor.
There are other reasons for preferring output rather than price
as the primary indicator of consumer welfare. In most markets, firms
have more control over output than they do over price. This is most
true in competitive markets, although it is less true as markets are more
monopolized. A seller in a perfectly competitive market lacks any
control over price bu t usually has full control over output. A corn
farmer cannot meaningfully ask “what price should I charge” for this
year’s crop. She will charge the market price. While she has the power
to charge less, she has no incentive to do so because she can sell all
she produces at the market price. The one absolute power she does
have, however, is to determine output. The decision whether to plant
1000 acres in corn, 500, 100 acres or even zero is entirely hers and
depends only on her capacity to produce.
The consumer welfare principle in antitrust is best understood
as pursuing maximum output consistent with sustainable competition.
In a competitive market this occurs when prices equal marginal cost.
More practically and in real world markets, it tries to define and
identify anticompetitive practices as ones that reduce market wide
output below the competitive level. Output can go higher than the
competitive level, but then at least some prices would have to be below
cost. As a result, the definition refers to “sustainable” but competitive
levels of output. If output is too high some firms will be losing money
and must eventually raise their prices or exit.
Consumer welfare measured as output serves the customer’s
interest in low prices and also in markets that produce as wide a variety
of goods and services as a competition can offer. It also serves the
interest of labor, which is best off when production is highest.
Concurrently, it benefits input suppliers and other participants in the
market process. For example, if the output of toasters increases,
consumers benefit from the lower prices. Labor benefits because more
toaster production increases the demand for labor. Retailers, suppliers
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of electric components, shipping companies, taxing authorities and
virtually everyone with a stake in the production of toasters benefits as
well.
Antitrust is a microeconomic discipline, concerned with the
performance of individual markets rather than the economy as a whole.
It is worth noting, however, that a goal of high output in a particular
market contributes to a well-functioning overall economy. For
example, macroeconomic measures such as GDP are based on the
aggregate production of goods and services in the entire economy
under consideration. All else being equal, when a particular good or
service market experiences larger competitive output the overall
economy will benefit as well.8 That issue would almost never be
relevant in any particular antitrust case, but it can be important at the
legislative or policy level. Increasingly people have observed a link
between competition policy – particularly high price-cost margins –
and the performance of the economy as a whole.9
What is not included in consumer welfare under the antitrust
laws? First, bigness itself is not an antitrust issue unless it leads to
reduced output in some market. That is, the consumer welfare
principle is consistent with very large firms. It favors economies of
scale and scope.10 To be sure, very large firms can injure small firms
8

For a good introduction to these issues, see JOHN BELLAMY FOSTER AND
ROBERT W. MCCHESNEY, THE ENDLESS CRISIS: HOW MONOPOLY-FINANCE
CAPITAL PRODUCES STAGNATION AND UPHEAVAL FROM THE USA TO
CHINA (2017).
9
For good commentary, see Jonathan B. Baker, Overlapping Financial
Investor Ownership, Market Power, and Antitrust Enforcement: My
Qualified Agreement with Professor Elhauge, 129 HARV. L. REV. FORUM
212, 219-225 (2016); Anna Gelpern & Adam J. Letivin, Considering Law
and Macroeconomics, 83 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. i (2020); Chad Syverson,
Macroeconomics and Market Power: Context, Implications, and Open
Questions, 33 J. ECON. PERSP. 23 (2019) Tay-Cheng Ma, Antitrust and
Democracy: Perspectives from Efficiency and Equity, 12 J. COMP. L. &
ECON. 233 (2016).
10
An economy of scale is a cost that declines as a firm produces a larger
amount. An economy of scope is a cost that declines as someone produces a
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that have higher costs or lower quality products. The impact of the
consumer welfare principle on small firms is complex, however, and
requires close analysis of individual cases. While small competitors
of a large low cost and high output firm can be injured, many other
small firms benefit, including suppliers and retailers. A good
illustration is Amazon, which is a very large firm that generally sells
at low prices and has maintained high consumer satisfaction.11
Amazon has undoubtedly injured many small firms forced to compete
with its prices and distribution. At the same time, however, Amazon
acts as broker for millions of small firms who use its retail distribution
services.12 When a very large firm produces more, it creates
opportunities for other firms that sell complements, that distribute the
products that a large firm produces, or that supply it with inputs. So
once again it is important not to paint with too broad a brush. Blowing
up Amazon could ruin many small businesses.
As for labor and antitrust, that relationship is also complex and
has changed over time. During the early years of Sherman Act
enforcement organized labor was widely believed to be a source of
monopoly. Many of the earliest antitrust criminal prosecutions were
directed at labor unions.13 For example, Eugene Debs went to prison
in 1895 as a result of a conviction under the Sherman Act.14 Congress
larger variety of products, or in a larger number of places. For example,
because of joint costs a firm might be able to produce toasters and space
heaters out of the same plant more cheaply than two firms that each produced
one of the two products.
11
See Jon Markman, How Amazon.com Remains the Ruler of Retail, FORBES
(Jan. 30, 2020) (Amazon #1 in consumer satisfaction for three consecutive
years).
12
For statistics, see https://www.feedbackexpress.com/amazon-1029528new-sellers-year-plusstats/#:~:text=Amazon%20US%20stats,and%20more%20than%2060%20c
ountries. (last visited July 20, 2020) (noting that Amazon has 5 million
independent sellers, with 1.7 million currently listing products for sale).
13
See, e.g., Herbert Hovenkamp, Labor Conspiracies in American Law, 66
TEX. L. REV. 919 (1988).
14
See in re Debs, 158 U.S. 564, 596-600 (1895); and Hovenkamp, Labor
Conspiracies, id. at 920.
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came to labor’s rescue during the New Deal,15 and the result was the
development of a complex labor immunity that today reaches even
agreements among employers, provided that they are part of the
collective bargaining process.16
But years of anti-union activity largely deprived the unions of
the economic power and turned the tables. Most of the antitrust
concerns about labor today are with anticompetitive practices that
suppress wages, not with worker power to extract higher wages.17
Agreements among employers not to hire away one another employees
(“anti-poaching” agreements) are unlawful per se.18 Today a fair
amount of litigation is directed at overly broad use of labor
noncompetition agreements, which are formally vertical but subject to
antitrust attack when they are used by many firms in a market to
impede worker mobility.19

15

Id. at 928, 929, 962.
Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 518 U.S. 231 (1996) (extending labor antitrust
immunity to agreement among multiple NFL team owners involved in
collective bargaining).
See 1B PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT
HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶¶255-257 (5th ed. 2020).
17
See Ioana Marinescu and Herbert Hovenkamp, Anticompetitive Mergers in
Labor Markets, 94 IND. L.J. 1031 (2019); Herbert Hovenkamp, Competition
Policy for Labour Markets, OECD Directorate for Financial and Enterprise
Affairs
(5
June
2019),
available
at
https://one.oecd.org/document/DAF/COMP/WD(2019)67/en/pdf. See also
Suresh Naidu, Eric Posner & E. Glen Weyl, Antitrust Remedies for Labor
Market Power, 132 HARV. L. REV. 537 (2018).
18
See the Justice Department’s statement, “No More No-Poach: The Antitrust
Division Continues to Investigate and Prosecute “No Poach” and wageFixing Agreements,” available at https://www.justice.gov/atr/divisionoperations/division-update-spring-2018/antitrust-division-continuesinvestigate-and-prosecute-no-poach-and-wage-fixingagreements#:~:text=When%20companies%20agree%20not%20to,compete
%20for%20those%20employees'%20labor.&text=Naked%20no%2Dpoach
%20and%20wage,product%20prices%20or%20allocate%20customers.
(spring 2018).
19
E.g., Deslandes v. McDonald’s USA, LLC, 2018 WL 3105955 (N.D. Ill.
June 25, 2018) (parallel use of noncompetition agreements among
16
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Are there situations in which a practice that the consumer
welfare principle would approve might nevertheless harm labor? Yes,
when the practice in question reduces the demand for labor as a result
of cost savings rather than a decrease in output. Consider the merger
between Chrysler and Jeep, two producers of automobiles.20 The
merger was small as automobile mergers go and was lawful under the
antitrust laws. Nevertheless, a likely result of such a merger would be
consolidation of dealerships and some elimination of duplicate jobs.
After the merger it is cheaper for Chrysler and better for consumers if
Chryslers and Jeeps are sold through a common dealership. Sales and
service can be performed by a common staff, reducing the number of
employees to less than the number required by two separate facilities.
At the same time, however, the overall automobile market remains
competitive on both the consumer side and the input (labor) side. To
the extent this consolidation reduces Chrysler/Jeep’s costs, output of
automobiles would go up.
Consolidations can reduce the demand for labor even though
the firms could not possibly injure competition in any market. For
example, if two pediatricians in New York City should form a
partnership they might decide to share a single secretary or assistant.
A job would be eliminated, but without any competitive harm to any
market. So the consumer welfare principle does not condemn every
practice that reduces the demand for labor, but only those practices that
do so monopolistically, by suppressing the demand for labor rather
than by reducing the amount of it that a firm needs. It is not antitrust’s
purpose to subsidize employment by requiring firms to use employees
that they do not need. The merger that reduces the demand for labor
through efficient consolidation is no different in principle than any
McDonald’s franchsees). See HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST
POLICY: THE LAW OF COMPETITION AND ITS PRACTICE §4.1d (6th ed. 2020).
20
The acquisition, which occurred in 1987, was with American Motors,
which at that time had already acquired Jeep. See “Chrysler is Bying
American Motors,” NEW YORK TIMES (March 10, 1987), available at
https://www.nytimes.com/1987/03/10/business/chrysler-is-buyingamerican-motors-cost-is-1.5-billion.html.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3656702

8

Hovenkamp, Consumer Welfare

July. 2020

other production change that requires less labor – for example, when a
manufacturer shifts from a labor intensive assembly process to a more
automated one that requires fewer employees.
If we really wanted to protect jobs from all changes that reduce
the demand for employment we would do better to change the patent
laws rather than antitrust law. Changes in technology almost certainly
have greater and more explicit effects on labor than do mergers or
other procompetitive antitrust practices. For example, a “Job
Protection from Innovation Act” might provide that patent applications
must show as a condition of patentability that their invention will not
lead to a loss of jobs. No one advocates for such a statute because its
economically harmful implications are too clear.
Distinguishing pro- from anti-competitive reductions in labor
is not always easy. Most of the time the difference can be inferred from
market structure. For example, if two small firms in a large field merge
and eliminate a certain number of duplicate jobs, the reason is highly
likely to be more efficient use of resources. As the employee-side
market share of the two firms becomes larger, however,
anticompetitive explanations become more plausible. Then it becomes
necessary for a tribunal to investigate whether efficient consolidation
or inefficient labor suppression is going on.21

21

Cf. United States v. Anthem, Inc., 855 F.3d 345, 371-374 (D.C.Cir. 2018)
(then Circuit judge Kavanaugh, dissenting, noting dispute about whether
lower provider rates result from hospital merger would result from increase
efficiency or anticompetitive suppression of input prices). See also Elena
Prager & Matthew Schmitt, Employer Consolidation and Wages: Evidence
from Hospitals (SSRN working paper Jun 2019), available at
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3391889
(citing
evidence that hospital mergers in concentrated markets can result in wage
suppression for employees such as nurses and that the dominant explanation
if employer power over labor).
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Getting to Consumer Welfare
Antitrust policy has not always articulated a consumer welfare
principle. It is largely a creature of the 1960s and after.22 Historically,
economists almost always used “welfare” to describe “general” or
“total” welfare, which was the welfare of all participants in the
economy. For example, Pareto optimality assesses equally everyone
who is affected by an economic action, producers as well as
consumers. The same thing is true of Kaldor-Hicks efficiency, which
assesses welfare changes by comparing the welfare of all gainers
against the welfare of all losers. A change is a welfare improvement
if the gainers gain enough to compensate fully the losers out of their
gains.23
Oliver Williamson advocated a so-called “welfare tradeoff”
model for antitrust in the 1960s,24 and Robert Bork popularized it in
the 1970s.25 The Williamson proposal was a variant of the total welfare
model. It proclaimed an antitrust practice such as a merger to be
competitively harmful if the welfare losses that it produced exceeded
any welfare gains.26 Bork in particular used the model to offset gains

22

Robert Bork used the term in 1960s, but in a way that referred to general
welfare. See Robert H. Bork, Resale Price Maintenance and Consumer
Welfare I, 74 YALE L.J 775 (1965); & II, 77 YALE L.J. 950, 950 (1968);
Robert H. Bork, The Rule of Reason and the Per Se Concept: Price Fixing
and Market Division II, 75 YALE L.J. 373 (1965). The phrase had a few
earlier uses, but none that became popular. Perhaps the most important is
Arnold C. Harberger, Monopoly and Resource Allocation, 44 AM. ECON.
REV. 77 84 (1954) (monopoly harms consumer welfare). See also Covey T.
Oliver, The Fair Trade Acts, 17 Tex. L. Rev. 391 (1939) (arguing that resale
price maintenance (“fair trade”) harms consumer welfare).
23
See, e.g., RICHARD POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE (1981); Jules L.
Coleman, Efficiency, Exchange, and Auction: Philosophic Aspects of the
Economic Approach to Law, 68 CAL. L. REV. 221 (1980).
24
Oliver E. Williamson, Economies as an Antitrust Defense: The Welfare
Tradeoffs, 58 AM. ECON. REV. 18 (1968).
25
ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH
ITSELF 107-112 (1978).
26
Bork, id. at 107 (discussing Williamson, supra note __ at 21).
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and losses as between consumers and producers, not giving much
attention to effects on third parties.
One particularly damaging feature of the welfare tradeoff
model was that a relatively small profit increase for producers was
sufficient to offset rather large price increases to consumers. As a
result, even practices that raised price significantly were thought to
promote welfare. For example, Williamson concluded that under
typical assumptions about elasticities of demand a cost reduction of
1% - 4% would be sufficient to offset a price increase of about 20%.27
“More generally it is evident that a relatively modest cost reduction is
usually sufficient to offset relatively large price increases.”28 This led
Williamson to conclude that “a merger which yields non- trivial real
economies must produce substantial market power and result in
relatively large price increases for the net allocative effects to be
negative.”29
What he did not acknowledge was the severe
measurement difficulties that would accompany most attempts to
measure the size of welfare gains against welfare losses.
Williamson did acknowledge that a merger or other practice
that resulted in both efficiencies and a price increase would also reduce
output. That is true of any price-increasing practice. However, he did
not consider where these efficiencies would come from. Two of the
most important sources of efficiency are economies of scale in
production and purchasing economies for inputs. However, these
occur only at higher rates of output and, thus, of purchasing. So the
fact that output goes down takes away the most important sources of
efficiencies. To be sure, there are exceptions that can result from
reorganization of production. For example, suppose one merging firm
is producing 50 washers and 50 dryers at an inefficiently low rate and
the other merging firm is also producing 50 washers and dryers
inefficiently. After the merger the two firms might be able to switch

27

Williamson, Economies, supra note__ at 22.
Ibid.
29
Id. at 23.
28
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their production so that all of the washers are produced in one plant
and all of the dryers in the other. Further, it might reduce output to 90
units of each, reflecting its increased market power, and still produce
them more efficiently than it did before. But this would require not
merely a merger but also significant reorganization or production.
Some efficiencies are so substantial that post-merger prices are
lower than they were prior to the merger. In that case, however, there
is nothing to trade off. That merger would be lawful under the
consumer welfare test because it benefits rather than harms consumers.
The Government’s Horizontal Merger Guidelines take this approach,
permitting an efficiencies defense to a merger only if efficiencies are
so significant that output is at least as high after the merger as before.30
Other types of efficiencies can conceivably be attained at lower
output levels, such as increased technological complementarity, access
to IP portfolios, or redeployment of management. But merger law also
requires that these efficiencies be “merger specific,” which means that
they cannot reasonably be attained except through merger.31 Talent
can be hired and IP can be licensed. In sum, the range of merger
specific efficiencies that can result from an output reducing practice is
very likely extremely small.
Bork’s approach to the welfare tradeoff problem was also
unique in another and quite damaging way. He disagreed with
Williamson about the wisdom of measuring a welfare tradeoff,
asserting that efficiencies simply cannot be measured. Using
economies of scale as an example, he concluded that the problem of
efficiency measurement is “utterly insoluble.”32 Rather, efficiencies
should be taken on faith. When market power is completely lacking
efficiencies can be inferred, because they are the only explanation that
30

Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission, Horizontal Merger
Guidelines
§10
(August,
2010),
available
at
https://www.justice.gov/atr/horizontal-merger-guidelines-08192010.
31
Ibid.
32
BORK, ANTITRUST PARADOX, supra note __ at 126.
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makes a practice profitable. For example, when the two New York
pediatricians form a partnership and move into a single building they
could not be exercising market power. Their union is profitable only if
it reduces costs or improves the quality of their services. But that
argument falls apart in the presence of any amount of market power.
Then the action can be profitable if it either reduces costs or raises
prices to noncompetitive levels.
Importantly, however, Bork’s idea that efficiencies are
impossible to measure permits someone to look at the alarming
increase in price-cost margins over the last several decades and dismiss
them as reflecting nothing more than efficiencies – simply by not
requiring evidence. Under Bork’s tutelage we have seen a dramatic
rise in margins, and thus in the presence of monopoly power, over the
past forty years.
Bork also did antitrust an important disservice by naming his
version of the welfare tradeoff approach “consumer welfare,” even
though it expressly took into account the combined welfare of
consumers and producers.33 That conception of “consumer welfare”
haunts antitrust to this day. Under it, for example, the dissenters in the
Supreme Court’s Actavis decision could speak of antitrust as adhering
to a consumer welfare principle even as they would have approved a
practice (pay-for-delay) that resulted in very substantially higher
prices to consumers.34 Or in the American Express decision the
majority could profess adherence the consumer welfare principle even
as they were approving a practice that resulted in higher consumer

33

See, e.g., Daniel A. Crane, The Tempting of Antitrust: Robert Bork and the
Goals of Antitrust Policy, 79 ANTITRUST L.J. 835, 836 (2014) (“Bork shifted
from consumer welfare to total welfare without changing labels, hence
equating antitrust policy with efficiency while continuing to package it in a
consumer welfare pill that courts would easily swallow.”)
34
See FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 570 U.S. 136, 161 (2013) (Roberts, C.J.,
dissenting, along with Justices Scalia and Thomas).
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prices every time it was applied.35 In both cases the practice was
highly profitable to producers, and that was all that mattered.
Conclusion: Maximum Sustainable Output
We live in an era when monopoly profits are very high,36 when
labor’s share of the returns to production has declined sharply,37 when
overall economic growth is significantly smaller than it was in the midtwentieth century,38 and economic inequality is near an all-time high.39
Antitrust is not a cure-all for these problems, but it does have its role.
It does best when it sticks to its economic purposes and lets other
legislative agendas handle the rest. Even so, pushing output back up
to competitive levels can do a great deal of good and, along with other
policy choices, can assist in addressing all of these problems.

35

Ohio v. American Express, 138 S.Ct. 2274, 2290 (2018) (Thomas, j., for
the majority). See HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY, supra note
__, §10.10. The challenged practice forbad merchants from offering
customers a lower price in exchange for using a cheaper credit card.
36
See Herbert Hovenkamp & Carl Shapiro, Horizontal Mergers, Market
Structure and Burdens of Proof, 127 YALE L.J. 1996 (2018).
37
David Autor, et al, Concentrating on the Fall of the Labor Share, 107 AM
ECON REV: PAPERS AND PROCEEDINGS 180, 181-83 (2017).
38
See https://tradingeconomics.com/united-states/gdp-growth-annual.
39
See LARRY M. BARTELS, UNEQUAL DEMOCRACY: THE POLITICAL
ECONOMY OF THE NEW GILDED AGE (2d ed. 2018).
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